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THOUGHTS ON THE NORTH DAKOTA
PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS ACT
CHANCELLOR WILLIAM B. CHANDLER III*

Given the topic of the day, and never having traveled to North Dakota,
I thought it appropriate to find out a bit about the similarities and differences between our two states. My superficial internet-based inquiry led me
to a conclusion all of you probably already know: Delaware is older, smaller, and lower than North Dakota. Delaware became a state on December 7,
1787, and is proudly known by Delawareans as “The First State.” North
Dakota became a state over 100 years later, on November 2, 1889. North
Dakota is over thirty times the size of Delaware in total land area, but
Delaware’s population density is over thirty times greater than North
Dakota’s. The highest point in Delaware, known as the Ebright Azimuth, is
nearly 300 feet lower than the lowest point in North Dakota, which is along
the Red River. As some of you know, the state bird of Delaware, the Blue
Hen chicken, is an animal close to my heart, and I was interested in the state
bird of North Dakota, which I learned is the Western Meadowlark. That
appears to be a fine animal, but with all due respect, no comparison to the
mascot of my alma mater, the University of Delaware. While satisfying my
curiosity about North Dakota’s state bird, I discovered another similarity
between our states that some of you may not know. North Dakota and
Delaware share the same state beverage: milk.
More recently it appears that North Dakota and Delaware share an
interest in corporate law and corporate governance. I guess it was natural,
therefore, that my friend and former colleague, Dean Paul LeBel, invited
me to deliver remarks about the new North Dakota Publicly Traded
Corporations Act. I think Dean LeBel was hoping I would contrast it with
the Delaware General Corporation Law, the corporate law of my
jurisdiction, and offer criticisms of the NDPTCA. These remarks, however,
will be far more modest in scope.

*
William B. Chandler III was appointed Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery in
1997. Previously, the Chancellor engaged in private practice, served as Legal Counsel to former
Delaware Governor Pete DuPont, and served as Resident Judge of the Delaware Superior Court.
The Chancellor holds membership in the American Law Institute, the Delaware Bar Association,
and the American College of Business Court Judges. He is a Trustee of the Weinberg Corporate
Governance Center at the University of Delaware and the Yale Law School Corporate Governance
Center.

1052

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 84:1051

A corporation, of course, is nothing more than an artificial structuring
of the rights and responsibilities of a business’ owners, the shareholders, as
well as those chosen by the owners to act on their behalf, the directors and
officers. To the extent that corporations excel over other business forms in
the generation of wealth, they have become the dominant type of commercial organization. Similarly, to the extent that a particular allocation of
rights and responsibilities within the strictures of the corporate form excels
in the creation of wealth for its owners, that particular form will, again,
prevail. This is the discipline of the market. I would like to speak to you
today, then, about markets; how they affect corporate regulation, how they
determine what forms corporations and corporate law may take, and how
they determine the attractiveness of possible forums of incorporation.
To put the case, perhaps, with a crudity that does justice to the law of
neither North Dakota nor Delaware, the North Dakota approach to issues of
corporate governance is characterized by a belief that regulation of corporate rights and responsibilities can best be done by the state legislature, via
statute, acting to protect the interests of shareholders as the owners of the
corporation. The Delaware approach embodies the belief that the owners
themselves are, through the flow of their capital, the best regulators of
corporate governance, that the courts must vindicate the choices made by
these corporate owners within a framework of common law fiduciary rights,
and that the discipline of the market (that word again!) will ultimately
provide the optimum level of shareholder rights.
It will not surprise you that I am a believer in the Delaware approach.
As I mentioned, I have the feeling that I was invited here to criticize the
North Dakota Act. But why would I do that? Any paltry criticism I or
others might offer of an individual state’s approach to corporate governance
will be irrelevant: a flow of capital to or away from a jurisdiction will ratify
or denigrate any statutory scheme far beyond our poor power to pass
judgment. In any event, I am all for competition. I am all for different
approaches to corporate governance being put to the test of real world
conditions—in the “laboratory” of federalism I will discuss in a moment. I
applaud the Legislature and the Governor of North Dakota for having the
courage to put forth a novel approach to corporate law. I applaud as well
the vision and entrepreneurial spirit of the “father” of this legislation,
William Clark, who not only drafted the Act but attempted to see it
implemented in his home state of Pennsylvania, then Vermont, and finally,
successfully, here in North Dakota. Without his intellectual effort, and
without his extraordinary perseverance, the North Dakota Act would never
have come to be.

2008]

THOUGHTS ON THE NDPTCA

1053

I have said I am in favor of different approaches to corporate regulation
being given a real-world—that is, market-based—trial, and so I am, so long
as it is at the state level. One of the destructive side effects of the current
economic climate is that it has given Congress the impetus to intrude into
the field of corporate governance, historically an area properly reserved for
the states and governed by state law. The problem with regulation at the
federal level is that it does not encourage various approaches, as represented
by the statutes of North Dakota and Delaware, that we are discussing today.
Just the opposite: regulation by Congress or the SEC stifles the kind of
healthy experimentation that can lead to improvement in the law. We have
seen the destructive effects of such “one-size-fits-all” legislative paroxysms
arising during economic disruptions far less serious then the current one,
Sarbanes-Oxley being the most obvious example of blunt and over-broad
legislative populism driven by public anger inflamed by a sensationalizing
press producing a cure worse than the illness. I spoke earlier of the flow of
capital which may ratify either the North Dakota or the Delaware approach;
overbearing federal regulation results in a similar flow—the market will not
be denied—but unfortunately, having no domestic outlet due to the
preemption of the arena by the federal legislation, the flow is from the
United States, and to London and other foreign financial capitals.
But enough of federal misadventures. What of differing state approaches like the two before us? North Dakota now allows an incorporating
entity to accept an entire slate of regulations designed to enhance
shareholder control of the corporation; Delaware allows the entity to adopt
such internal constraints in favor of shareholder control up to, but only up
to, the extent the entity finds it in its interest to do so. In other words, what
North Dakota coercively imposes, Delaware permits. Both our states’ laws
regulate only firms incorporating in our respective states, so corporations
are insulated from the problem of having to follow conflicting rules.
Because our federal system allows both the North Dakota and the Delaware
approach to exist, the two statutes will be exposed to a marketplace of many
individual actors, including corporate decision-makers as well as investors
directing capital flow to these corporations. The market will eventually
reveal which approach is a superior wealth-producer for investors.
This is the beauty of the federal system, what Yale Law School
Professor Roberta Romano calls the “genius” of federalism. This facet of
federalism embodies neatly the kind of self-organizing structures that
economic philosophers like F. A. Hayek point out far exceed the ability of
any group of individuals, acting deliberately, to allocate assets for the
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production of wealth. In an earlier time of financial crisis, in New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann1, Justice Brandeis (otherwise no particular fan of free
markets) stated that: “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest
of the country.”2 With the enactment of the Publicly Traded Corporations
Act, in the arena of corporate governance and shareholders’ rights, North
Dakota has become the embodiment of Justice Brandeis’ “single courageous state,” and I salute you for it!
How do I think the marketplace will respond to these two models?
Again, it will not surprise you to learn that I suspect the Delaware approach
will ultimately prevail. Why? As I have already mentioned, where the
North Dakota law is prescriptive, the Delaware statute is permissive. The
many shareholder-friendly provisions of the North Dakota Act are available
to Delaware corporations as well, should they choose them. Delaware’s
approach to the corporate charter and by-laws is contractual in nature; the
incorporators can choose the basket of shareholder rights that they believe
will strike the right balance between corporate stability and governability,
on one hand, and shareholder rights on the other. How will they know if
they have it right? By the same mechanism that will ultimately pass judgment on the different statutory approaches of North Dakota and Delaware:
by the flow of capital into the corporation.
For instance, Delaware permits, but does not require, shareholders or
directors to adopt by-laws that require that directors be elected by majority,
rather than plurality, vote, and that such provision may not be repealed by
the directors. Although our statute does not coerce, a majority of Fortune
500 companies incorporated in Delaware have implemented this option.
Similarly, Delaware law permits, but does not require, corporations to
provide that the election of the board of directors be unified, rather than
staggered. North Dakota imposes this requirement by statute. Despite
Delaware’s permissive approach, staggered boards are disappearing in
Delaware as shareholders demand their elimination. Because shareholders
control the flow of capital, the elimination of staggered boards is brought
about by the private ordering of actors participating in the activities of the
firm—that is, by market mechanisms—and not by the prescriptive power of
the legislature. The same phenomenon is occurring with respect to poison
pill provisions: Delaware allows private ordering of the relationship between managers and stockholders, and as the absence of a poison pill
1. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
2. New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311.
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becomes important to shareholders, corporate by-laws increasingly eliminate them. Thus, I see the privately-ordered charters and by-laws of
Delaware as every bit as “shareholder friendly” as the regime imposed on
corporations under the North Dakota law. More so, in fact, to the extent
that the market insures that eventually the corporation will “get it right,”
that is, come up with that combination of streamlined governance and
shareholder rights which best leads to the formation of wealth. After all,
there is no “right” of shareholders more valuable than to be among the
owners of a corporation that generates wealth!
Under what set of assumptions would North Dakota’s prescriptive approach be superior to what I see as the wealth-enhancing privately-ordered
Delaware approach? If the assumption is that the full panoply of shareholder rights mandated by North Dakota is superior to any sub-set of those
rights, a corporation can, and would have an incentive to, simply choose all
those rights from the Delaware menu. If the assumption is that shareholders
are powerless vis-à-vis managers, then the managers will simply choose to
incorporate in Delaware without the shareholder protections, so as to keep
the shareholders at heel. In this “race to the bottom” scenario, Delaware
would once again come out ahead. Even if such an overbearing set of
managers wished to incorporate in North Dakota, they could choose to opt
out of the new statute entirely.
The assumption, therefore, must be that shareholders have enough
power to ensure the selection of a full set of regulations if offered readymade, a la North Dakota, but not sufficient power to negotiate a private
ordering of rights under the Delaware market-based system. In that case,
only under the prescriptive system offered by North Dakota will shareholders be able to impose a regime that will maximize their rights and at the
same time their wealth. Of this proposition, I must say, I am skeptical.
But I am, of course, biased. Not alone by being a Delawarean, but by
being a common-law judge, as well. As a common-law jurist, I tend to
believe that the organic growth of a body of law is superior to the strictures
of a Code Napoleon, with its overweening specification, definition, categorization, and prescription of every imaginable act. To my admittedlyprejudiced eye, the North Dakota statute has that look: the look of a field of
action so thoroughly occupied by legislative fiat that creativity is crowded
out. It is the genius—if I may use that phrase again—of the common law
that legislative pronouncement is replaced by considerations of the duty of
one actor to the other. This idea of duty forms the basis of the American
model of common law: managers owing fiduciary duties of loyalty, good
faith, candor, and care to their shareholder-principals. Unlike the positivist
North Dakota statute—chock-full of mandatory terms specifying how

1056

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 84:1051

corporations must go about their business—under Delaware’s equitable
principles corporate decision-makers are free to act as they find best, within
the strictures of their fiduciary duties. This maximizes freedom and creativity while protecting shareholder interest by requiring that that freedom and
creativity be conducted for the benefit of the shareholders. That is what I
refer to as the genius of the common law.
Such a system, of course, depends heavily on the exercise of independent judgment by the judiciary. Where the limitations on management
actions are defined by a judicial interpretation of fiduciary duty—rather
than by an exhaustive list of “dos” and “don’ts” prescribed by the Legislature—the system will operate only as well as the judges are skillful.
Delaware was fortunate that, when it first enacted its equitably-based
general corporate law over a century ago, it had in place a specialized
court—the Court of Chancery—that was something of an anachronism, a
court specializing in equity law. The existence of a court of specialists in
trusts and equitable relations gave Delaware an advantage then and, in all
modesty, continues to give it an edge in corporate law today. No matter
how brilliant its drafters, no matter haw far-sighted its legislators, no codebased system can offer the flexibility and nuance of a common law court,
aided by able counsel, reacting to each individual question of corporate
governance put before it by interested parities with a stake in the outcome.
Next to this system, legislative action is a blunt tool indeed.
The beauty of a decisional-law system like that of the Court of
Chancery is that it allows protection of shareholder rights in a way that
encourages shareholder confidence, through an incremental legal development using specific factual situations, while still encouraging broad action
and innovation by corporate officers and directors, protected under our law
by the business judgment rule. The judge-made law created by the Court of
Chancery and by the Delaware Supreme Court is a much finer instrument,
for good or for ill, than bright-line statutory pronouncements—a scalpel as
opposed to the legislative axe.
It appears to be among the intentions of the North Dakota law to blunt
the advantage that Delaware receives, as a locus of incorporation, from its
well-regarded court system, by enacting a detailed code that makes legislators, not judges, the prime actors in the system. Mr. Clark, I believe, has
made this argument explicitly. I have two reasons to doubt the success of
this project. First, I doubt any regulations can be comprehensive enough
and tightly-drafted enough to be free of ambiguities that require interpretation by judges. Second, assuming that is possible, it would so restrict corporate action that companies operating under those requirements would be
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at a significant competitive disadvantage. But if I am wrong, the experiment you have started here will soon demonstrate it!
Note that the system of corporate governance in a common law system
as I have described it—where corporate managers are free to act as they see
fit, bound by the strictures of their fiduciary duties owed to their
shareholders—is the direct analog of how freedom works in a market
system. In this system, participants are free to retain, sell, and use their
property as they see fit, constrained by certain legal requirements (individual ownership of property, the binding nature of contracts, the requirement
that representations not be fraudulent, etc.). In fact, the common-law approach to corporate governance is simply another kind of market, in which
corporate managers are free to make decisions to use resources, conduct
business, and, if they can, create wealth, constrained by broad fiduciary
duties rather than by rigid and narrow prescriptive law. If they succeed,
they will attract capital and prosper. If they fail, capital will flow
elsewhere.
Thus we have come full circle. The federal system is a marketplace of
ideas expressed through state legislation. I applaud North Dakota for
having entered with a novel approach to corporate law, thus expanding the
range of choices available and improving the market. That is one market.
A second market is created by the methodology of the Delaware General
Corporation Law, in which Delaware permits corporations to choose from
among a wide array of possible combinations of shareholder powers in the
realm of corporate governance, a marketplace in which those combinations
perceived best at producing wealth for shareholders prevail over other
forms. A third is the marketplace created by the wide sphere within which
managers may make decisions in a common-law jurisdiction where
shareholder protections are defined by fiduciary duties, rather than a rigid
code, and in which firms prosper or fail accordingly.
As I have made clear, I favor a market approach over the alternative,
because, after all, we are dealing here with corporations, and if a market
approach is not optimal, then we have problems more fundamental than
determining how best to advance shareholder rights! In any event, the
differences between our two approaches are material enough that, if I am
wrong, we will soon know it. Let the contest begin, let the marketplace of
federalism do its work, and let the best system prevail!*

*
I would like to thank Sam Glasscock (who serves with me on the Court of Chancery as the
Master in Chancery) and James M. Belger (who served as my Law Clerk for the 2008-2009 term)
for their invaluable suggestions for and assistance with this speech. All errors are mine, however.

